

Would You Vote for A Young Person?

A National Survey of Voter Attitudes, Past Voting Behaviour, and
Future Voting Intentions Ahead of Nigeria's 2027 General Elections



VOTERS' PREFERENCE SURVEY

Youth

invictus
AFRICA

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About Invictus Africa

Invictus Africa is a civic-tech organisation that leverages data and technology to drive inclusive policies and programs, equitable resource utilisation, and institutional accountability.

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We are deeply grateful to the 12,444 individuals who responded to the survey questionnaire across Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Following systematic data cleaning and quality-assurance screening, 1,248 records were excluded because they did not satisfy specified quality-control criteria, yielding a final analytical sample of 11,196 respondents. Their responses form the basis of the findings presented in this report.

Our profound gratitude also goes to the field enumerators who administered the survey through face-to-face interviews across Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory between March and May 2026, covering selected senatorial districts and hard-to-reach communities across the country. Their adherence to the multistage sampling protocol and commitment to data quality made this rigorous, nationally representative survey possible and strengthened the credibility of its findings ahead of Nigeria's 2027 General Elections. The field enumerators were:

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Executive Director's Note



Young people make up a significant proportion of Nigeria's population and electorate. They are active in civic movements, political campaigns, voter mobilisation, public debate, and community leadership. Yet, their presence in elected office remains limited. This raises an important question: Are Nigerians unwilling to vote for young persons, or are young people not being given sufficient opportunities to emerge, contest, and become visible to voters?

The young person's report of the Voters' Preference Survey (VPS) Series seeks to bring voters' voices into this conversation. Drawing from a nationally representative survey of 11,196 eligible voters across Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, the report examines previous voting behaviour, perceptions of young people as political candidates, the factors that influence voter choices, and willingness to vote for young persons in the 2027 General Elections.

The findings challenge some common assumptions about voters' attitudes towards young candidates.

Among respondents who had never voted for a young person, 79.9 per cent said they were unaware of any young candidate on the ballot. At the same time, 74.3 per cent of all respondents said they would vote for a young person in the 2027 General Elections, while nearly six in ten said that merit would be enough for a young candidate to earn their vote. These findings suggest that young people's low representation in elected office may not be explained simply by an unwillingness among Nigerians to vote for them. They also point to questions about candidate emergence, visibility, and voter awareness.

Are young people receiving fair opportunities to secure party nominations? Where they are contesting, are voters sufficiently aware of their candidacies? Do they have access to the financial resources, political networks, party structures, media attention, and

campaign support needed to compete effectively? And where voters express a willingness to support young candidates, what might prevent that intention from becoming an actual vote?

It is important to distinguish between the absence of young candidates and voters' lack of awareness of them. A young person may have appeared on the ballot without receiving enough visibility for voters to recognise their candidacy. A candidate may also have contested under a party with limited reach or without the resources required to run an effective campaign. In either case, the voter may leave the election with the impression that no young person contested. The findings therefore invite us to look beyond voter attitudes and examine the wider political environment in which young people seek office.

Political representation is shaped long before election day. It is shaped by who is encouraged to run, who can afford the cost of nomination and campaigning, who is able to navigate internal party processes, who receives the support of party leaders, and who is presented to voters as a credible and viable candidate.

Young people are often encouraged to participate in politics, but participation must mean more than campaigning for others, mobilising voters, or providing energy to political movements. It must also include a genuine opportunity to influence decisions, lead political institutions, contest competitive positions, and hold elected office.

The finding that many voters are willing to support young candidates based on merit is encouraging. However, merit should not be used as a standard that young people must prove under conditions that are already unequal. Young persons are not asking to be elected merely because of their age. They are asking for a fair opportunity to contest, present their ideas, demonstrate their competence, and be assessed on their character, experience, proposals, and record. For this to happen, they must first have meaningful access to political platforms and the resources required to compete.

For political parties, the findings call for closer attention to how young people are recruited, nominated, placed on the ballot, financed, and supported. Parties must move beyond symbolic youth inclusion and create clear pathways through which capable young people can emerge as competitive candidates.

For policymakers and electoral institutions, the report provides evidence that can support reforms aimed at reducing the barriers that make political participation costly and difficult for young persons.

For civil society organisations and the media, the findings offer direction for advocacy, voter education, leadership development, candidate visibility, and more substantive coverage of young people seeking office.

The report also speaks to young people themselves. Greater representation will require sustained participation, stronger political organisation, credible engagement with communities, and the development of records that voters can assess and trust.

After the 2027 General Elections, we intend to return to some of the respondents who participated in this survey. We will seek to understand whether they were aware of young persons on the ballot, whether they voted for them, and, where they did not, what influenced their decisions.

Our hope is that this report will move the conversation from asking whether Nigerians are willing to vote for young people to asking whether young people are being given a fair chance to contest, whether voters know who they are, and what must change to turn stated willingness into actual votes and greater representation.

It is my hope that the evidence in this report will support more honest conversations, stronger advocacy, and practical action towards increasing the political participation and representation of young persons in the 2027 elections and beyond.

Bukky Shonibare

Acronyms

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
CCT	Central Coordinating Team
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
LCA	Latent Class Analysis
LGA	Local Government Area
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PWD	Person with Disability
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
VPS	Voters' Preference Survey
VPS-Women	Voters' Preference Survey – Women Series
VPS-Youth	Voters' Preference Survey – Youth Series
VPS-PWDs	Voters' Preference Survey – Persons with Disabilities Series
WRAPs	Women's Representation in African Politics

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Executive Summary

The question at the centre of most discussions about youth political exclusion in Nigeria is why young people do not stand for office. The Voters Preference Survey (VPS) asks a different, and equally important, question: when young candidates do appear on the ballot, how do voters respond, and why? Youth candidates cannot win elections without votes, yet there is almost no nationally representative evidence on what Nigerian voters actually think about young candidates, what drives or inhibits their support, and what would make them more likely to vote for a young person in 2027.

The VPS – Youth is the first nationally representative study designed to fill this gap. It reached 11,196 eligible voters across all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Responses were weighted to reflect the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 2023 national voter population across gender, age group, and geopolitical zone.



What the Data Shows

1. Information Sources

1 in 4 

Only 1 in 4 voters (26.7%) rely exclusively on digital and social media for political information.

The majority either combine digital with traditional media such as radio and television (32.5%), draw primarily from party channels and community networks (28%), or engage across all source types simultaneously (12.8%).

2. Voter Influence

42.2% 

4 in 10 voters (42.2%) acknowledge being influenced by someone.

Party leaders exert stronger influence over male and more educated voters, while religious leaders hold greater sway over voters with no formal education and those from the North-West.

3. Past Voting Behaviour

4 in 10 

4 in 10 Nigerian voters (41.1%) have previously supported a youth candidate in any election since 1999.

Among those who have not, the overwhelming majority (79.9%) were never given the opportunity: no youth candidate appeared on their ballot. Attitudinal resistance accounts for only 12.1% of non-supporters.

4. Why Voters Supported Youth Candidate

63.9% 

Nearly two thirds of past supporters backed a youth candidate based on their record and character.

A further 17.2% considered both candidate quality and social or party factors. Only 18.9% were driven primarily by who the candidate was rather than what they had done.

5. Voter Openness

74.3% 

Nearly three in four voters say they will vote for a youth candidate in 2027.

This is almost double the share who have previously done so. The Youth in Leadership Openness Index stands at 3.52 out of 5, indicating moderate overall openness across the electorate.

6. Who is Most Likely to Commit

77.2% 

Middle-aged voters lead commitment at 77.2%, ahead of young voters at 74.5%.

North-West records the highest commitment of any zone, while the South-East records the lowest. Muslim voters record stronger commitment than Christian voters. Voters who use traditional media, those whose decisions are shaped by party leaders, and those who prioritise candidate quality are more likely to commit.

7. Where Openness Has Limits

17% 

Nearly 1 in 6 confirmed 2027 voters have not yet committed to a youth candidate.

Voters who would back a youth candidate for the House of Assembly are less willing to do so for the presidency; a difference of 10.5 percentage points that widens significantly in the North-Central, North-East, and among elderly voters.

8. What It Takes to Win Their Vote

6 in 10 

Nearly six in ten voters (59.5%) would support a youth candidate based on record and character only.

A further 15.9% set a high bar, requiring strong performance on both merit and identity. But, one in four (24.7%) make their decision mainly on the basis of party membership, ethnic background, and social endorsements.

What the Numbers Mean

1. The candidate supply problem is the dominant barrier, not voter resistance.

Among voters who had never supported a young candidate, 79.9% said they were unaware of any young person on the ballot. This suggests that candidate availability and visibility are major barriers to youth representation. Efforts to change voter attitudes must therefore be matched by action to support more young people to secure party nominations, appear on the ballot, and run visible and competitive campaigns.

2. Youth voters are not youth candidates' most reliable base.

Young voters themselves record some of the lowest rates of past voting for youth candidates. Middle-aged voters show stronger past support and higher future commitment across every measure. Campaigns and programmes that treat young voters as the natural audience for youth candidacy messages risk concentrating resources where persuadable support is weakest.

3. Voters want honesty and delivery, not a generational pitch.

Across every measure, voters who have supported or intend to support youth candidates are motivated primarily by character and track record. The Merit-First majority (59.5%) requires no age-based or identity signal at all. A youth candidate who leads with a concrete record of delivery and demonstrated integrity is positioned to reach more than half the electorate without any generational messaging. One who leads with age or representation alone will not move the voters they most need to reach.

4. High voters turn out does not guarantee support for youth candidates

The South-East records the lowest general voting commitment and the lowest youth-candidate commitment of any zone. These are two distinct problems requiring two distinct responses. General civic engagement must come first in that zone before youth-specific programming can gain meaningful traction.

5. What voters believe about young leaders shapes their vote more than anything else.

A voter's openness to youth in leadership is the single strongest predictor of whether they will commit to voting for a youth candidate in 2027, stronger than their age, religion, location, or any other factor tested. This means that programmes designed to shift how voters think about young people as leaders will achieve more than those built around voter demographics alone. Demographic targeting is useful for prioritising where to invest; it is not a substitute for the attitude change work itself.

6. Voters are more open to youth in parliament than in the presidency.

Voters are broadly comfortable with youth candidates in legislative roles. The hesitation is specific to executive offices, and it is concentrated in particular zones and age groups, not spread evenly across the electorate. This means the work of shifting executive-level acceptance can be targeted precisely.

What Needs to Happen:

Legislative Institutions



- Fully implement the Not Too Young to Run Act and close the gap between what the law says and what parties actually do during primaries and candidate screening.
- Pass laws that require parties to field a minimum number of youth candidates across all levels of elective office, not just legislative seats.
- Make youth inclusion rules enforceable with real consequences for violations during primaries, where most young candidates are pushed out.

Executive Institutions



- Appoint young people to senior government positions such as ministerial and advisory roles. Voters want to see evidence that young people can handle executive responsibility before they commit at that level, and that evidence can only come from giving young people real executive roles.

Political Parties



- Reduce filing fees, simplify nomination rules, and reform delegate structures that make it harder for young people to get on the ballot.
- Put young people on governorship and presidential tickets, not only on legislative slates. Voters will not extend support to youth at the executive level until they see credible young candidates running for those offices.
- Build and communicate the concrete records of youth candidates: communities served, problems solved, commitments kept. Broad integrity claims without evidence will not move most voters.
- Make sure youth candidates get consistent coverage through radio, television, and party channels. Campaigns that rely only on digital platforms risk missing the voters most likely to commit.

Civil Society Organizations



- Design civic education programmes that directly address how voters think about youth in leadership, not just general voter turnout and participation.
- Focus programmes specifically on youth in executive roles, not youth in politics generally. Use examples of what young leaders have actually delivered rather than arguments about generational rights or inclusion.
- Build different messages for different zones. In the North-West, lead with competence and delivery. In the South-South and North-Central, a representation argument can sit alongside a performance one. In the South-East, work on general civic participation first before adding youth-specific programming.
- Run long-term programmes in the North-East and North-Central and among elderly and less educated voters, where resistance to youth at the executive level is most concentrated. Work through trusted religious and community figures rather than broad external messaging.

Political Parties



- Monitor party primaries specifically for practices that push out young candidates and make sure complaint processes work fast enough to help before election cycles close.
- Use voter education to communicate what the data shows: most voters are already open to young candidates when they are honest, visible, and have a record. The barrier is candidate absence, not voter hostility.

Developmental Partners



- Fund interventions to get young candidates onto ballots including party reform, candidate support, and monitoring of how parties select their candidates.
- Invest in long-term attitude change programmes in zones and among demographic groups where resistance is most concentrated, with timelines that go well beyond the 2027 election.
- Help get the findings of this report into the hands of political parties, electoral institutions, and civil society organisations so that decisions about where to invest and what messages to use are grounded in evidence.



01

Introduction

1.1. Background

Young people make up the largest single bloc of Nigeria's registered voter population, yet they remain severely underrepresented among those who hold elected office. This gap between demographic weight and political power is not new, but it has become harder to ignore. The Not Too Young to Run Act, signed into law in 2018, was a deliberate attempt to begin closing it. The Act lowered the minimum age for contesting elective office to 25 years for the House of Representatives and State Houses of Assembly, 30 years for the Senate and governorships, and 35 years for the presidency. For the first time, the Constitution formally opened the door to youth candidacy at the highest levels of government.

In the 2023 General Elections, youth candidates aged 25–35 made up 28.6% of all candidates fielded by the 18 registered political parties. Of the 4,398 youth candidates who contested, 402 won elective seats, a success rate of 9.1%. None were elected as governors, deputy governors, or senators. Fourteen won seats in the House of Representatives, and 388 were elected to State Houses of Assembly (Yiaga Africa, 2023; Leadership Newspaper, 2022). These numbers confirm that while the legal door is now open, the path from candidacy to office remains narrow for most young candidates.

Most of the research attention that has followed these outcomes has focused on the supply side: why young people do not put themselves forward, why parties do not support them when they do, and what structural reforms might change this. This is important work. But it leaves a critical gap. Youth candidates cannot win elections without votes. What do Nigerian voters actually think when a young candidate appears on their ballot? What motivates those who have supported youth candidates in the past? What has held back those who have not? And what would it take to make voters more likely to support a young candidate in 2027?

The Voters Preference Survey (VPS) series is designed to answer these questions. It is the first nationally representative study of voter attitudes, past behaviour, and future voting intentions toward underrepresented groups as political candidates in Nigeria. This report presents findings for the youth module. Parallel reports covering women and persons with disabilities are published simultaneously as standalone documents. Across all three surveys, the VPS is guided by the following research questions:

1. To what extent have voters previously voted for candidates who are women, youth, or persons with disabilities, and what reasons informed those decisions?
2. What factors discourage voters from supporting candidates from these groups?
3. What perceptions do voters hold about women, youth, PWDs as political leaders in Nigeria?
4. Under what conditions are voters willing to vote for candidates from these politically underrepresented groups, in 2027 and beyond?
5. How do voter characteristics including gender, age, education, region, religion, urban-rural location, and party affiliation, shape these preferences?
6. To what extent do voters' stated pre-election intentions align with their reported post-election voting behaviour?

1.2. Methodology

Study Design

The VPS survey employs a panel research design implemented in two waves. Wave 1, conducted before the 2027 General Elections, serves as a crosssectional baseline capturing voters' historical voting behaviour regarding women candidates, their current attitudes and perceptions, and their stated intentions and conditional commitments for 2027. Wave 2, administered four to six weeks after the elections, follows up with a subsample of Wave 1 respondents who consented to recontact, collecting their selfreported actual voting behaviour and enabling longitudinal analysis.

Although the VPS survey instrument collected data on all three groups – women, youth, and persons with disabilities – within a single interview, the analysis and reporting for each group has been conducted separately. This report presents findings for the women module only. Parallel reports covering youth and persons with disabilities are published simultaneously as standalone documents. [Study Population and Eligibility Criteria](#)

The target population for the VPS survey is all Nigerian citizens aged 18 years and above who are registered to vote or meet the basic eligibility requirements to do so. The population includes voters from all demographic groups across Nigeria's 36 states and the FCT.

To be eligible for inclusion in the survey, a respondent must be:

- 18 years or older at the time of the survey.
- A Nigerian citizen.
- Able to understand the purpose of the survey and voluntarily agree to participate.

Sample Size Determination

The sample size was determined to achieve full national coverage across all 36 states and the FCT while ensuring sufficient precision for national and zonal level analysis. A target of 300 respondents per state and the FCT was set as the minimum coverage unit, producing a national target of at least 11,100 respondents. This figure was not derived from a state-level precision calculation but from the operational requirement to represent all 37 subnational units within a nationally representative design.

Assuming a 95% confidence level, maximum population variability ($p = 0.5$), and a design effect of 1.5 to account for clustering in the multistage sampling design, the target of 11,100 yields a national margin of error of approximately $\pm 1.14\%$. At the zone level, where the average analytical sample is approximately 1,866 respondents, the margin of error narrows to approximately $\pm 2.8\%$ after applying the design effect, well within the conventional $\pm 5\%$ threshold for subnational estimates.

Sampling Strategy

The survey employs a multistage stratified cluster sampling methodology, proceeding through four sequential stages:

Stage 1: Senatorial District Assignment: All senatorial districts across Nigeria's 36 states and the six area councils of the FCT were included. Each district was allocated 100 respondents.

Stage 2: Urban-Rural Stratification and LGA Selection: Within each senatorial district, enumerators listed all LGAs and classified them into urban and rural clusters. One LGA was randomly selected from each cluster using a simple ballot technique, yielding two LGAs per district – one urban and one rural. Where a district contained only urban or only rural LGAs, two LGAs were randomly selected from the available cluster. The allocated sample of 100 respondents was equally distributed, yielding 50 per LGA.

Stage 3: Ward Selection: Within each selected LGA, all wards were listed alphabetically and assigned numbers. Two wards were randomly selected from each LGA using the simple ballot technique, giving four wards per senatorial

district. Each ward carried a target of 25 interviews.

Stage 4: Location and Respondent Selection: Within each selected ward, enumerators identified a central landmark as a starting point and randomly selected a direction of travel. Locations were selected at systematic intervals. Where multiple eligible respondents were present at a selected location, one was randomly selected for interview.

Data Collection Method and Tools

Data were collected between March and May 2026 through faceto-face, interviewer-administered surveys conducted by trained enumerators fluent in the local languages of their assigned senatorial districts and selected LGAs.

Data were collected using a structured questionnaire consisting of six sections:

- Section A captures respondent demographic information including state, LGA, ward, location type, gender, age, disability status, religion, education level, employment status, and income level.
- Section B covers general voting behaviour and political preferences, including past voting history, general 2027 voting intention, primary sources of political information, candidate selection criteria, and external influences on voting decisions.
- Sections C, D, and E capture attitudes and behaviour toward women, youth, and persons with disabilities as political candidates respectively. Each section covers past voting behaviour, reasons for support or non-support, future voting intention, office-level willingness, enabling conditions for support, and perceptions of the group as political leaders measured through Likert scale items.
- Section F seeks informed consent for Wave 2 post-election follow-up and collects contact information from consenting respondents.

Data were captured electronically using KoboCollect, with completed interviews uploaded to a secure server each day. To minimise order effects, Sections C, D, and E were presented in randomised order across interviews, an automated feature of the KoboCollect platform.

Enumerator Preparation and Field Supervision

The survey was administered by 102 enumerators who received comprehensive orientation on study objectives, eligibility criteria, sampling procedures, use of KoboCollect, protocols for obtaining informed consent, interview procedures, data quality requirements, and management of difficult field situations. An explainer video addressing question administration procedures and standards was made available to all enumerators as a supplementary resource. On completion, enumerators took a comprehension assessment. Candidates who did not meet the required benchmark score were not cleared for fieldwork.

Enumerators reported to designated supervisors within the Central Coordinating Team (CCT), comprising members of Invictus Africa's Data and Research Department and Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation unit. The CCT monitored incoming data in real time through the KoboCollect server, including using GPS coordinates to confirm respondent locations. Supervisors conducted routine check-ins with enumerators throughout the data collection period to address challenges and maintain data quality standards.

Data Quality Assurance

Data quality was monitored and maintained through a set of pre-defined criteria applied at the point of collection and during post-submission review by the Central Coordinating Team.

- All respondents were required to meet the eligibility criteria. Interviews conducted with ineligible respondents were invalidated and excluded from the dataset.
- Submissions with unrealistically short completion times were flagged for review and invalidated where the duration indicated that the interview could not have been properly administered.

- All completed interviews were required to be uploaded to the KoboCollect server by 7:00 PM on the day of collection. Submissions uploaded after this deadline were flagged. No completed survey was permitted to remain on an enumerator's device overnight.

Data Cleaning and Preparation

Following fieldwork, a total of 12,444 responses were collected nationwide. Prior to analysis, the dataset underwent systematic review and cleaning. A total of 1,248 records were excluded on the basis of duration-based quality flags, resulting in a final analytical dataset of 11,196 valid responses. Key preparation steps also included variable harmonisation to reconcile group-specific sections (C, D, and E) that were randomised to control for order effects.

Survey Weighting

To ensure that analytical findings are representative of the Nigerian voting population, survey responses were weighted using an iterative proportional fitting procedure (raking) implemented via the survey package in R. Weighting adjusted the sample to align with population proportions derived from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 2023 voter register across gender, age group and geopolitical zone.

All analytical findings reported in this study use weighted estimates unless otherwise stated. Demographic profile descriptions and voter participation pattern figures are reported using unweighted estimates to accurately describe the composition of the sample rather than the broader population.

Analytical Approach

All data analyses were conducted in R Studio. The analytical approach consisted of five methods.

- *Descriptive Analysis and Cross-Tabulation.* Percentage distributions were computed for all key variables. Findings were cross-tabulated across the study's primary disaggregation variables – gender, age group, education level, religion, geopolitical zone, and urban-rural classification – to identify meaningful differences in voter attitudes and behaviour across subgroups. Chi-square tests of association were used to assess the statistical significance of observed differences across categorical variables.
- *Latent Class Analysis (LCA)* was applied to five sets of multi-select survey items to identify distinct voter profiles that would not be visible through aggregate analysis alone. LCA was conducted on: information consumption patterns; candidate selection criteria; reasons for support among past voters of youths candidates; reasons for non-support among non-voters; and enabling conditions for future support. The optimal number of classes in each model was determined using standard model fit criteria including the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), alongside class size adequacy.
- *Binary Logistic Regression.* Two binary logistic regression models were estimated. The first modelled the likelihood that a voter had previously voted for a youth candidate, and the second modelled the likelihood that a voter would definitively commit to voting for a youth in 2027. Both models included the same set of predictors: demographic characteristics, information source category, voting criteria type, and primary influence source. The second model additionally included the composite Youths in Leadership Openness Index score as a predictor.
- *Youth in Leadership Openness Index .* Eight Likert scale items measuring voter openness toward youth in political leadership were combined into a composite index score for each respondent, ranging from 1 (most resistant) to 5 (most open). Prior to computing the index, internal consistency was assessed using Cronbach's alpha, with a threshold of 0.7 required to justify combining the items into a single score. Negatively worded items were reverse-coded so that a higher score consistently reflects greater openness. Mean index scores were compared across demographic subgroups using independent samples t-tests and one-way ANOVA following visual inspection of distribution plots which confirmed approximate normality.
- *Merit-Share Score Computation.* For each respondent, the share of their selected candidate selection criteria and enabling conditions that fell into the merit-based category was computed as a continuous score. Mean

merit shares were reported and compared across demographic subgroups using independent samples t-tests for two-group variables and one-way ANOVA for multi-group variables.

Ethical Considerations

Participation in the study was entirely voluntary. Before each interview, enumerators obtained verbal informed consent and explained the purpose of the survey, the voluntary nature of participation, and the respondent's right to skip any question or withdraw at any time without consequence. No incentives or payments were offered.

Respondents were assured that their answers would be reported only in aggregate form and would not be shared with any political party, government agency, or individual. Contact information collected for Wave 2 followup is stored separately from survey responses and used solely for recontact purposes.

Because the survey includes sensitive topics such as religious and cultural beliefs about leadership, voting behaviour, and attitudes toward marginalised groups, enumerators received training on administering such questions respectfully. Respondents who expressed discomfort were not pressured to answer, and their decision was honoured without affecting the remainder of the interview.

Limitations

The VPS survey followed rigorous procedures to ensure data quality and representativeness. Nonetheless, certain limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings.

Attitudinal items related to youths candidates may be affected by social desirability bias, with respondents overstating their willingness to support youths in an enumerator-administered interview. Although the instrument included indirect and experimental techniques to reduce this bias, it cannot be fully eliminated in a faceto-face context.

Past voting behaviour was measured through selfreport, which may be subject to recall error, particularly for earlier elections. Likewise, stated voting intentions for 2027 reflect preferences at the time of the interview and may not predict actual behaviour. These limitations introduce some imprecision into estimates of both historical and future voting patterns.

Nine senatorial districts could not be reached due to resource and security constraints (Abia South, Akwa Ibom North East, Anambra South, Bayelsa Central, Benue North East, Borno North, Delta North, Ondo South, and Taraba North). However, this shortfall is unlikely to affect national or zonelevel representativeness, as the weighted sample closely aligns with the national registered voter population across key demographic and geographic variables (Table 1.0).

Finally, the preelection wave is crosssectional, capturing attitudes and intentions at a single point in time. Associations between voter characteristics and behaviour should therefore not be interpreted as causal. The longitudinal panel introduced in Wave 2 will provide a stronger basis for assessing whether preelection attitudes predict postelection outcomes.

1.3. Respondent Demographic Profile and Participation Pattern

The VPS–Youths pre-election survey reached 11,196 eligible voters across Nigeria’s 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Respondents were drawn from 203 Local Government Areas (26.2% of Nigeria’s 774 LGAs), 102 senatorial districts (out of Nigeria’s 109), and all six area councils of the FCT.

Respondents were mostly male (59.9%), with youth aged 18–34 accounting for about half the sample (52%) and middle-aged adults (35–49 years) accounting for one third (33.2%). The sample is roughly evenly split between Christianity (50.5%) and Islam (47%), reflects a predominantly married adult population (56.1%), and is largely educated, with over half holding post-secondary qualifications (54.8%). Urban and rural respondents are nearly equally represented, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) account for 4.8% of the sample.

The survey captures a largely active and experienced electorate, with just one in five (20.1%) who have never voted in any election since 1999, and of these, the majority (86.6%) are youth, with an average age of 23 years.

To ensure that findings reflect the broader voter population rather than the specific composition of those surveyed, survey weights were applied and responses calibrated against the INEC 2023 Voter Registration Statistics on gender, age group and geopolitical zone (Table 1.0). All subsequent findings in this report are based on weighted figures unless otherwise stated.






Table 1.0: Survey Sample Composition Compared to INEC 2023 Voter Register

Category	INEC 2023 ¹ (%)	Sample Estimate Unweighted (%)	Sample Estimate Weighted (%)
Gender			
Male	52.50	59.9	52.5
Female	47.50	40.1	47.5
Age Group			
Youth (18-34)	39.65	52.0	39.7
Middle-Aged (35-49)	35.75	33.2	35.8
Elderly (50-69)	18.94	13.2	18.9
Old (70+)	5.66	1.5	5.6
Geopolitical Zone			
North Central	16.56	20.3	16.6
North East	13.42	16.3	13.5
North West	23.81	21.8	23.8
South East	11.78	11.8	11.8
South South	17.07	14.0	17.1
South West	17.08	15.9	17.1

¹Source: INEC 2023 Voter Register



02

**The Nigerian Voter:
Decision-Making Patterns
and 2027 Intentions**

2.1. Information Sources Used by Voters

Social media is the most widely used individual source of political information in Nigeria, cited by 62% of voters, followed by radio (47.6%) and television (38.8%). However, when sources are grouped into broader categories, digital and social media (67.9%) and traditional media (66.1%) are nearly tied, a finding that cautions against assuming Nigeria's political information environment has become fully digital. Party channels, comprising campaigns and rallies, party representatives, and party manifestos, rank third at 43.4%, indicating that direct political mobilisation still reaches a significant share of the electorate.




Figure 2.1: Information Sources Used by Nigerian Voters



Beyond individual channels, a latent class analysis of information consumption patterns reveals that Nigerian voters cluster into four distinct profiles (Figure 2.2). The largest group, the Hybrid Media Voter (32.5%), combines traditional and digital media in roughly equal measure, reflecting the broader national pattern. Close behind are the Party & Community Voter (28%), whose information flows primarily through campaigns, party representatives, and religious and traditional leaders, and the Online Voter (26.7%), who relies almost exclusively on social media. The smallest but most comprehensively engaged profile is the Multi-Channel Voter (12.8%), who draws on virtually every available source at high rates. Taken together, no single profile dominates; each accounts for roughly a quarter to a third of the electorate.




Figure 2.2: How Nigerian Voters Consume Political Information, Four Profiles Identified Through Latent Class Analysis



What This Means

Because no single voter information profile dominates, programmes designed to shift attitudes toward youths-candidates must invest in multi-channel delivery to achieve meaningful national reach. Relying solely on digital channels risks excluding a large segment of the electorate.

2.2. Criteria Driving Candidate Choice

When choosing a candidate, Nigerian voters are guided primarily by track record, perceived integrity and honesty, and qualification. Endorsement by a trusted figure is the highest-ranked social influence criterion, suggesting that third-party validation carries more weight than family recommendations or direct party loyalty. Identity-based criteria including party affiliation, religious affiliation, age, gender, and ethnic background, are cited by a minority.

This candidate-centred orientation is broadly consistent across gender, age, and location, but varies with education, religion and across geopolitical zones (Annex Table 2.1). More formally educated voters lean more heavily on candidate quality, while those with little or no formal education are more likely to factor in identity considerations

such as religious or party affiliation. Religion follows a similar pattern: Christian voters weigh candidate quality more heavily than Muslim voters, who give relatively more weight to identity-based criteria. Geographically, the North-West stands out as the zone where identity considerations carry the most weight, while the South-East is the most candidate-centred.




Figure 2.3: What Nigerian Voters Look for in a Candidate

Beneath these aggregate patterns, a latent class analysis reveals three distinct decision-making profiles among Nigerian voters (Figure 2.4). The dominant profile is the Candidate-Quality Voter, accounting for nearly three quarters of all voters (72.7%). These are voters for whom a candidate's track record, integrity, and qualifications are decisive, with little weight given to identity or endorsement. The second profile, the Social & Identity Voter, makes up roughly a quarter of the electorate (24.6%). These voters weigh candidate quality alongside party loyalty, religious affiliation, and the recommendations of people they trust. A small third group, the All-Criteria Voter (2.7%), applies virtually every consideration at once rather than a distinct set of priorities.






Figure 2.4: How Nigerian Voters Weigh Candidate Selection Criteria: Three Distinct Profiles Identified Through Latent Class Analysis



What This Means

The three distinct voter profiles confirm that while candidate quality dominates nationally, a substantial minority of voters make decisions through a social and identity lens that candidate-centred campaigns alone may not reach.



The Social and Identity Voter, roughly one in four voters, represents the most persuadable group for inclusion messaging. Given that endorsement already ranks among the top five voting criteria nationally, targeted engagement with religious and community leaders to champion qualified youth candidates is likely to carry real weight with this segment.

2.3. External Influences on Voter Decisions

While most Nigerian voters describe themselves as independent decision-makers (57.8%), about four in ten (42.2%) acknowledge being influenced by someone in their voting choices. Among this group, the most decisive external voices are party leaders, media, religious leaders, and family, each commanding roughly similar levels of influence (Figure 2.5).

Who influences a voter, however, depends considerably on who that voter is. Among female voters, family and media are the primary influence sources, while male voters are more likely to be influenced by party leaders (Figure 2.6). For youth, family carries the greatest weight, reflecting the social embeddedness of younger, often first-time voters in household decision-making. Religious leaders are the primary influence source for nearly a quarter of Muslim voters (23.8%), compared with fewer than one in ten Christian voters (7.3%), who are more likely to be influenced by media and party leaders. This pattern is mirrored geographically: the NorthWest, where Islam predominates, records the highest reliance on religious leaders of any zone (31.1%), while the SouthWest is the most party-driven and the SouthEast the most influenced by media. Education shows a similar gradient: among more formally educated voters, media and party leaders dominate, whereas those with little or no formal education are more likely to defer to religious leaders.




Figure 2.5: Who Influences Nigerian Voters the Most





Figure 2.6: Who Influences Nigerian Voters the Most: Patterns Across Key Demographic Groups

What This Means



Religious leaders are among the most decisive influence sources for Muslim voters and in northern zones, particularly the North-West. Any strategy to shift attitudes toward youths candidates in these communities must engage religious leaders directly.



Civil society organisations rank last as an influence source among voters who are already influenced by someone. This should prompt a frank reassessment of civic education delivery models, since voters are more likely to respond to information that comes through the people and channels they already trust.

2.4. General 2027 Voting Intention




Figure 2.7: Voting Intention for the 2027 General Elections

Looking ahead to the 2027 General Elections, eight in ten Nigerians (79.7%) say they will definitely vote, with only a small minority (5.5%) expressing definite disengagement.

This high level of commitment is broadly similar across gender, age, and education, though some regional differences stand out. The biggest gap is between the NorthWest, where more than nine in ten voters say they will definitely vote (91.8%), and the SouthEast, where definite voting intention falls to 64.7% and more than a quarter of eligible voters in the zone (28%) remain unsure.

General 2027 Voting Intention by Geopolitical Zone

Zones	Yes, Definitely (%)	Not Sure (%)	Definitely Not (%)
North West	91.8	5.0	3.2
North Central	81.2	13.8	5.0
South South	81.5	12.8	5.7
North East	78.3	16.7	5.0
South West	71.2	20.5	8.3
South East	64.7	28.0	7.3

The strong general voting intention figure also sets an important baseline for what follows. When voters who say they will definitely vote in 2027 are asked whether they will vote for a woman candidate specifically, any gap between those two figures will reflect candidate-specific attitudes rather than broader voter disengagement.

What This Means



The South-East stands out as the zone with the lowest voting commitment and highest uncertainty ahead of 2027. Voter mobilisation efforts in this zone, particularly those targeting youth candidates, need to address general civic engagement before they can effectively address inclusion specifically.





03

**Voting for Youth
Candidates: What Past
Elections Reveal**

3.1. Past Voting Behaviour

About four in ten Nigerian voters (41.1%) have ever voted for a youth candidate in any election since 1999 at any level.




Figure 3.1: Have Nigerian Voters Ever Voted for a Youth Candidate?

Among the demographic, geographic, and behavioural factors examined, age, education, settlement type, geopolitical zone, and voting criteria type emerge as the strongest predictors of past voting for youth candidates (Figure 3.2, Annex Table 3.1). Young voters themselves are the least likely group to have previously supported a youth candidate. Only about one in three young voters (32.3%) has ever done so, compared to about half of middle-aged (47.2%), elderly (46.8%), and older voters (45.3%). This likely reflects fewer electoral cycles among younger voters rather than lower enthusiasm for youth candidates.

Education also has a positive influence: voters with Diploma/NCE qualifications (46.0%) and bachelor's degrees (42.5%) are more likely to report past support compared to those with no formal education (37.9%). In contrast, urban residents (39.4%) are slightly less likely than rural voters (42.7%) to have voted for a youth candidate. The North-West records the highest past support of any zone (52.8%), while the South-East records the lowest: fewer than one in four voters (25.1%) there have ever supported a youth candidate.

Voters who use traditional media such as radio, television, and newspapers, are about twice as likely to have previously voted for a youth candidate as those who do not. Digital and social media, party channels, and community leaders show no independent effect. Of all the factors tested, how voters make decisions matters most: voters who rely more heavily on identity-based criteria are three times more likely to have supported a youth candidate, and those who prioritise candidate-centred criteria are nearly twice as likely compared to those driven by social influence (Annex Table 3.1).

Do voters who intend to turn out in 2027 have a stronger track record of supporting youth candidates than those who do not? Figure 3.3 suggests a modest but not overwhelming connection. Among voters who say they will definitely vote in 2027, 47% have previously supported a youth candidate. This still means that more than half of committed voters have never done so, indicating that while turnout intention and support for youth candidates are related habits, one does not guarantee the other.




Figure 3.2: Variation in Past Voting for a Youth Candidate Across Voter Groups




Figure 3.3: Do Committed 2027 Voters Have a History of Supporting Youth Candidates?

What This Means



Young voters are not the natural or automatic base for youth candidates. Older voters who have participated in more elections show a stronger track record of supporting youth candidates. Campaign and advocacy strategies that treat youth voters as the primary audience for youth candidacy messages may misread where persuadable support actually lives.



Youth candidates who invest heavily in digital platforms while neglecting traditional media may be concentrating their resources where the association with past youth-candidate support is weakest.

3.2. Reasons for Past Support

When voters who have previously supported a youth candidate explain why, their reasons almost always focus on what the candidate stands for and what they have done, rather than who they are. Honesty and trustworthiness top the list (51.9%), followed by the ability to deliver development (49.0%) and a proven track record (35.0%). These three considerations suggest that voters who have backed youth candidates in past elections prioritised credibility and competence. For a meaningful share of supporters, however, the choice was both generational and partisan: youth representation (30.7%) and preferred party affiliation (30.4%) follow closely and are nearly tied.




Figure 3.4: Reasons Why Voters Chose a Youth Candidate



Figure 3.5: Top Five Reasons for Past Support by Demographic Group

Geography shapes why voters supported youth candidates more than any other factor (Figure 3.5). In the North West, support is driven almost entirely by character and performance. Honesty and trustworthiness (58.7%) and ability to deliver development (53.2%) dominate, while youth representation is very low at 17.1%. Voters who backed youth candidates there did so for the same reasons they would back any candidate; the fact that the candidate was young mattered very little.




Figure 3.6: Motivational Profiles Among Voters Who Have Supported Youth Candidates

The North East, South West, and South East shows a similar competence focused pattern, but with slightly more openness to the generational argument. Youth representation in these zones ranges from 21.2% to 26.3%: present, but not a major driver. The South South and North Central stand apart. In both zones, performance and generational motivation carry almost equal weight. Youth representation is relatively high: 46.5% in the South South and 44.5% in the North Central, while performance considerations remain just as strong. For voters here, supporting a youth candidate was both a judgment of competence and a deliberate generational choice.

Four clear voter profiles emerge among people who have previously supported a youth candidate, and each tells a different story about what motivated their choice (Figure 3.6). The largest group is the Credibility Voter

(45.7%). They care most about the candidate's honesty, trustworthiness, and ability to deliver development. Youth representation matters somewhat, but identity factors play almost no role for them. At the opposite end is the Identity Voter (18.9%). For this group, candidate qualities matter far less. Their support for a youth candidate is driven mainly by political, religious, and ethnic affiliation. For the Result Oriented Voter (18.2%), track record and qualifications are the key factors. Little else influences their decision. Finally, the All Round Voter (17.2%) expects everything. They score high across nearly all factors – candidate qualities as well as social and identity considerations. For them, a youth candidate had to meet multiple standards at once.

What This Means



In the South-South and North-Central, where youth representation ranks among the top motivations for past support, framing youth political participation as a democratic inclusion issue is likely to resonate. In the North-West, where representation barely features as a driver, the same message will carry far less weight. Advocacy programmes should match their framing to the motivational landscape of each zone rather than applying a single national message.



The Credibility Voter (45.7%) requires no identity or generational appeal. Honesty, a development record, and demonstrated competence are sufficient to reach this group. However, the Identity Voter (18.9%) respond more to endorsements from trusted political, religious, or community figures. A campaign that leads with credentials while securing early, visible endorsements can speak to both groups effectively.

3.3. Reasons for Non-Support

Most voters who have never supported a youth candidate stayed away because of circumstances, not personal opposition. Over half of them (50.6%) say no youth candidate appeared on their ballot. Overall, structural barriers account for 55.8% of non support, while only 12.1% point to attitude based reasons and 9.4% to strategic ones. (Figure 3.7)




Figure 3.7: Why Voters Have Not Voted for a Youth

To understand this pattern more clearly, the latent class analysis shows that non supporters fall into three distinct groups (Figure 3.8). The largest group is the Constrained Voter (79.9%). Their barrier is almost entirely structural: most simply had no youth candidate on their ballot. There is no attitudinal resistance here, just lack of opportunity. The Pragmatic Voter (12.7%) did have options but chose the most electable candidate or felt the youth candidate

was not well-known enough. Their decision was practical, not anti-youth. The smallest group, the Skeptical Voter (7.3%), is the only one showing real resistance. For this group, the barrier is not opportunity but conviction. They cite lack of experience, the perception that youth are not taken seriously in politics, and doubts about qualifications. This group blends skepticism about youth competence with practical political reasoning.




Figure 3.8: Barrier Profiles Among Non-Supporters of Youth Candidates

What This Means



Most voters who have never voted for a youth candidate were never given the opportunity. The most urgent intervention remains candidate supply: party reform, primary process monitoring, and affirmative candidacy requirements that ensure youth candidates actually appear in front of voters.



Generic youth inclusion messaging will not persuade the Skeptical Voter. What could shift them is seeing young candidates who have a clear record of delivering results, along with public support from figures they already trust. This same approach also helps raise the perceived electability of youth candidates for the Pragmatic Voter. For both groups, party backing and consistent media presence are the conversion mechanisms.

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04

**Beyond Past Behaviour:
How Open Are Voters to
Youth Candidates?**

4.1. Voter Perceptions of Youths in Political Leadership

Nigerian voters generally believe that young people can succeed in politics, but only if they meet certain conditions. More than eight in ten voters agree that a youth candidate who focuses on everyday issues (83.2%), has a proven track record (86.3%), or is endorsed by respected leaders (82.4%) is likely to win their support. This suggests that voters are not opposed to youth in politics; they simply want competence and credibility first.

At the same time, many voters acknowledge that the political environment makes it difficult for young people to compete. More than half believe young candidates lack the money needed to run (55.1%), and nearly three quarters says that without party backing, a youth candidate stands little chance (72.4%). These views reflect systemic barriers rather than personal objections.

However, a significant share of voters also express deeper doubts about young people's readiness for leadership. Nearly half feel that young people lack experience (44.3%) or maturity (47.3%), though many disagree. Encouragingly, the idea that older people are simply better leaders is the most rejected claim in the entire survey, with nearly half of voters (49.4%) pushing back on it. This suggests that while youth face real hurdles, age alone is not widely seen as a qualification for leadership in Nigeria.




Figure 4.1: How Nigerian Voters Think About Youth in Political Leadership

What This Means



The most widely held enabling beliefs; that a youth candidate with a track record, a community focus, and respected endorsements can win, are already present across the electorate. Advocacy that reinforces and activates these existing beliefs is likely to be more effective than messaging that directly challenges doubts about experience or maturity.



Voters themselves recognise the structural obstacles young candidates face; financial barriers and lack of party backing rank among the most widely acknowledged. Reforms targeting party gatekeeping, nomination fees, and access to campaign financing address conditions that voters already identify as the real barriers to youth electoral participation, making the case for such reforms easier to communicate publicly.

4.2. Youth in Leadership Openness Index




Figure 4.2: Youth in Leadership Openness Index: Who Is Most and Least Open to Youth Candidates?

Eight survey statements were combined into a single score measuring each voter's overall openness to women in political leadership (Annex Table 4.1). The score ranges from 1 (most resistant) to 5 (most open). The Youth in Leadership Openness Index shows that Nigerian voters are, on average, moderately open to youth in political leadership, with a national mean score of 3.52. Importantly, this openness is broadly shared across nearly all demographic groups (no group scores below 3.30) suggesting a broadly positive baseline attitude toward youth candidates, even if the strength of that openness varies.

Differences across demographic groups are statistically significant but modest. Younger voters are the most open (3.57), and openness declines steadily with age, with elderly and old voters scoring notably lower (3.44 and 3.37). Education follows a similar pattern: those with no formal education are the least open (3.34), while university graduates are most open (3.59).

Among religious groups, Christians score slightly higher than Muslims (3.58 vs 3.47), while followers of traditional religion are the least open (3.30). Geographically, the North-East is the least open zone (3.39), while the North-West is the most open (3.58). Notably, gender and location (rural vs. urban) show no meaningful differences, indicating that men and women, and rural and urban voters, are equally open to youth candidates.

What This Means



Openness to youth in leadership is moderate across virtually every demographic group, which means no segment of the electorate requires a completely different approach. However, older voters, those with little or no formal education, traditional religion followers, and voters in the North-East consistently score lowest. Programmes operating in these contexts should invest in sustained engagement through trusted community and religious figures rather than broad external messaging.



Unlike attitudes toward women candidates, openness to youth leadership does not vary by gender. What does vary clearly is age, and this points directly to party-level reform: elder-dominated gatekeeping in primaries and nomination processes is where the structural barrier is most concentrated and where reform would have the greatest impact.





05

**Voter Intentions and
What Would Drive
Greater Support**

5.1. Future Voting Intention for 2027

Support for youth candidates is set to rise sharply in 2027. Three in four voters (74.3%) say they will definitely back a youth candidate, compared with just 41.1% who have ever done so in the past. The shift is especially strong among voters with no prior history of supporting youth candidates: six in ten of them (60.7%) now say they will do so in 2027. Still, even among the 79.7% who are firmly committed to voting next year, about one in six have not yet committed to a youth candidate: 12.1% are unsure and 4.9% say they definitely will not.




Figure 5.1: Will Voters Choose a Youth in 2027 (Donut chart)




Figure 5.2: How Committed and First-Time Supporters View Voting for a Youth in 2027

Several factors shape whether a voter says they will support a youth candidate in 2027, and the strongest is their overall openness to youth leadership. Voters who score higher on this measure are much more likely to commit than any other group (Annex Table 5.1). Some demographic patterns also stand out (Figure 5.3). Middle aged voters are slightly more likely to commit than young voters (77.2% vs. 74.5%). Education follows an inverted pattern: commitment rises sharply from voters with no formal education (64.6%) to those with primary and secondary education (77.4% and 77.2%). But it then declines with each additional qualification, falling to 62.7% among postgraduate voters, below the national average. In short, the most committed voters are not the most or least educated, but those in the middle. Muslim voters record the highest commitment of any religious group (78.2%), with Christian voters somewhat lower (72.1%), with Christian voters somewhat lower (72.1%), with Christian voters somewhat lower (72.1%).

Geography shows the biggest differences. Every zone is more committed than the South East (58.8%), and the North West is the most committed of all (86.5%). Information sources and decision making styles also matter. Voters who rely on traditional media for political information, and whose decisions are shaped by party leaders are both more likely to commit. And voters who base their choices on either candidate qualities or identity considerations are more committed than those who base their decisions mainly on social influence (Annex Table 5.1).




Figure 5.3: Future Intention to Vote for a Youth in 2027 Across Demographic Groups.

What This Means



[Campaigns] The 60.7% of voters who have never previously voted for a youth candidate but say they will in 2027 represent a large and reachable pool of first-time supporters. Their intention has already shifted. The task now is to strengthen that commitment and ensure it holds on election day.



[Programming] High voter turnout in 2027 will not automatically translate into stronger support for youth candidates. Nearly one in six confirmed 2027 voters remain uncommitted to a youth candidate, and the gap is sharpest in the South-East. Programmes should address concerns about youth experience and credibility directly, as these are the most cited barriers among resistant voters in that zone.

[Programming] Muslim voters show stronger commitment to voting for youth candidates than Christian voters, even though they score slightly lower on the openness index. This suggests that trusted intermediaries play an important role in turning attitudes into action in these communities. While religious leaders are the most influential voices for Muslim voters overall, it is endorsement from party leaders that most strongly predicts commitment to youth candidates specifically.

5.2. Willingness to Support Women Candidates by Office Level

Nigerian voters are broadly willing to support youth candidates in 2027, but that willingness is not equal across all offices. Legislative and local government positions attract the strongest support: nearly eight in ten would back a youth candidate for the House of Assembly (79.5%) or House of Representatives (78.1%), and about three in four would do so for LGA Chairperson (76.5%) or Councillor (74.5%). Support declines as the offices move toward the national executive. Willingness drops to 73.7% for Governor, 72.7% for Senator, 69.0% for President, 68.0% for Deputy Governor, and 63.6% for Vice President.




Figure 5.4: Percentage of Voters Willing to Support a Youth Candidate in 2027 for Each Office

The gap between the office with the highest willingness (the House of Assembly) and willingness at the apex of executive power, the presidency, is what we refer to as the acceptance ceiling (Figure 5.5). Nationally, the ceiling

stands at 10.5 percentage points (pp). But it is not uniform: gender, age, and geopolitical zone all show statistically significant differences in how wide it is.

Male voters have a wider ceiling (12.0 pp) than female voters (9.0 pp). By age, elderly voters show the widest gap (17.3 pp), while young voters have the narrowest (6.3 pp); making them the most consistent supporters of youth candidates across all offices. Geography produces the sharpest contrasts. The North Central has the widest ceiling of any group (22.8 pp), driven by very high willingness at the legislative level but dropping sharply at the presidential level. The North East (17.8 pp) and South South (16.4 pp) follow. At the other end, the North West shows virtually no ceiling (1.2 pp) and the South West very little (3.4 pp). Voters in both zones are almost equally willing to support a youth candidate regardless of the office.




Figure 5.5: Willingness to Vote for a Youth for President versus House of Assembly, by Demographic Group

What This Means



Legislative and local government offices are where youth candidates have the strongest electoral footing in 2027. Building a credible record in legislative or local government roles is the most credible path to eventually competing for executive positions in the future.



Elderly male voters and voters from the North Central, North East and South South record some of the widest acceptance ceilings. They are willing to support youth candidates in legislative roles but become much more hesitant at the executive level. Sustained engagement with these groups – focused specifically on youth in executive roles – is where investment in attitude change will yield the most return.

5.3. What Would Increase Voter Support

When voters explain what would make them support a youth candidate, merit comes out on top. Honesty and trustworthiness (46.5%) and a proven track record (45.8%) lead the list, followed by clear policies on key issues (31.4%), relevant education and experience (29.3%), and prior political experience (24.1%). Together, these merit-based conditions account for nearly three in four of all enabling conditions selected by the average voter (72.2%).

This merit first pattern holds across most groups, though its strength varies. While age makes little difference, women prioritise merit slightly more than men (73.2% vs. 71.4%). Voters with no formal schooling record the lowest merit share (61.3%), while those with postgraduate qualifications record the highest (78.9%). Religion shows a similar divide: Christian voters select merit based conditions most often (77.8%), while Muslim voters (66.4%), traditional religion followers (64.4%), and those with other beliefs (63.4%) all fall lower.




Figure 5.6: Conditions That Would Increase the Likelihood of Voting for a Youth Candidate

Geography reinforces this pattern. The North West records the lowest merit share of any zone (64.1%), closely followed by the North East (65.8%). At the other end, the South South (78.2%) and South East (78.1%) rank highest. For voters in northern zones, who the candidate is – their party, background, and endorsements – carries more weight than it does for voters in the south.

Three voter profiles capture how Nigerians think about the conditions for supporting a youth candidate (Figure 5.8). The Merit First Voter is the largest group, making up nearly six in ten voters (59.5%). For them, the decision is driven by candidate credibility: honesty and trustworthiness and a proven track record. No party signal, ethnic connection, or religious alignment is needed. The Identity Guided Voter (24.7%) operates differently. Party membership, ethnic background, endorsement by trusted leaders, and shared religion dominate. For this group, candidate quality is necessary but not sufficient. Supporting a youth candidate depends heavily on whether the candidate fits within their existing social and political networks. The High Bar Voter (15.9%) is the most demanding of the three. They apply a broader set of both merit and identity conditions at the same time. For them, no single criterion is decisive; a youth candidate must meet multiple standards at once before earning support.




Figure 5.7: Mean Percentage of Selected Conditions that are Merit-Based, by Demographic Groups




Figure 5.8: Three Distinct Voter Profiles on the Conditions for Supporting a Youth Candidate Identified Through Latent Class Analysis

What This Means



The majority of Nigerian voters fall into the Merit First category (59.5%). Campaigns that lead with honesty, a clear track record, and demonstrable policies are already positioned to reach this majority without any age-based or partisan messaging.



The gap in merit share between northern zones (64–66%) and southern zones (78%) is wide enough to warrant zone-specific approaches. Civic education efforts in the North-West and North-East should work to strengthen the weight voters give to candidate quality in their decision-making, delivered through the trusted intermediaries such as religious and community leaders, who already shape how voters in these zones think about political choices.



06

Conclusion and Recommendations

Three in four Nigerians say they will back a youth candidate in 2027, a level of support the ballot has never reflected. That gap is not a story of resistance; it is a story of absence. Young candidates have simply not appeared on enough ballots for voters to act on their stated openness. When they have appeared, voters have judged them by the same standards as everyone else: on what they have done, what they stand for, and whether they can deliver. Where hesitation does exist, it is concentrated in specific zones and demographic groups, most pronounced at the executive level, and narrow enough in most contexts to be closed.

The question this report raises is not whether Nigerian voters will support young candidates. Most already say they will. The question is whether the political system will place them on the ballot, and whether 2027 will mark the moment when voter openness to youth in leadership finally meets institutional opportunity.

These findings point to six areas where action would have the greatest impact. Each recommendation identifies the barrier it addresses and the specific institution responsible for acting on it.

1. Put more young candidates on more ballots.

Nearly eight in ten non-supporters of youth candidates (79.9%) were structurally constrained; no youth candidate appeared on their ballot. Until this changes, any other intervention is working around the primary problem. The immediate priority is not changing voters' minds but getting young candidates onto ballots.

What Needs to Happen:

- **Legislative Institutions:** Fully implement the Not Too Young to Run Act and close the gaps between what the law says and what parties actually do during primaries and candidate screening. Pass laws that require parties to field a minimum number of youth candidates across all levels of elective office.
- **Political Parties, INEC:** Review and reduce the filing fees, delegate structures, and nomination rules that make it harder for young people to get on the ballot in the first place.
- **Judicial Institutions, INEC:** Monitor party primaries closely for practices that push out young candidates. Make sure complaint processes work fast enough to actually help before the election cycle moves on.

2. Campaign on character and delivery, not on age.

Nearly six in ten voters belong to the Merit-First group. They do not need a generational pitch — they need to see that a candidate is honest, has a record, and knows what they stand for. Campaigns that lead with age or generational identity instead of substance will not reach this group.

What Needs to Happen:

- **Political Parties:** Invest in building and communicating the substantive records of youth candidates; communities served, problems addressed, policies advanced, commitment kept. Broad claims about integrity without evidence will not move the Merit-First majority.
- **Political Parties:** Ensure youth candidates receive consistent coverage through traditional media and party channels. These are the information sources most strongly associated with both past youth-candidate voting and future commitment. Campaigns that rely only on digital platforms risk missing the voters most likely to commit to a youth candidate.
- **Political Parties, Civil Society Organisations:** For the Identity-Guided Voter (24.7%), endorsements from trusted religious, community, and party figures are not optional extras. They are what converts interest into a vote. In zones where social networks shape voting decisions most strongly, securing these endorsements early should be a deliberate part of any campaign plan.

3. Recognise that young voters are not automatically youth candidates' base.

Young voters are neither the strongest nor the weakest supporters of youth candidates. Middle-aged voters consistently show stronger past support and higher future commitment across every measure. Campaigns and programmes that focus almost entirely on young voters as the natural audience for youth candidacy messages are likely to miss where the real persuadable support lives.

What Needs to Happen:

- **Civil Society Organisations:** Design civic education programmes that speak to all age groups, with extra attention to middle-aged voters who are already strong supporters and elderly voters who are the most hesitant about youth candidates in executive roles.
- **Political Parties:** Reach beyond urban, digitally connected audiences. Middle-aged, rural, and traditionally informed voters are a more reliable base for youth candidates than campaigns typically assume.

4. Voters are open to youth in parliament. The presidency is a different story.

Voters are broadly willing to back youth candidates for legislative and local government seats. The hesitation shows up at the executive level. Nationally, the gap between willingness to vote for a youth candidate for the House of Assembly and willingness to do so for the presidency stands at 10.5 percentage points. In the North-Central (22.8 pp), North-East (17.8 pp), South-South (16.4 pp), and among elderly voters (17.3 pp), that gap is much wider and will not close without deliberate effort.

What Needs to Happen:

- **Political Parties, Executive Institutions:** Put young people on governorship and presidential tickets and appoint them to senior government roles. Voters want to see a track record before they back youth at the executive level, and that track record can only be built through real executive responsibility and visibility.
- **Civil Society Organisations:** Design programmes that focus specifically on youth in executive positions, not youth in politics generally. Show voters examples of young leaders who have delivered results.

5. Match the message to the zone

The same message about youth candidacy will not work everywhere. In the North-West, voters who backed youth candidates did so almost entirely because of the candidate's character and track record. The fact that the candidate was young barely mattered. In the South-South and North-Central, performance and generational motivation carry almost equal weight.

What Needs to Happen:

- **Political Parties, Civil Society Organisations:** Build different messages for different zones rather than applying one national message for everyone. In the North-West, focus on what the candidate has done and what they stand for. In the South-South and North-Central, both performance and representation arguments can be part of the same message.
- **Civil Society Organisations, INEC:** In the South-East, general voter turnout and youth-candidate support are both the lowest of any zone. Tackle general civic engagement first before adding youth-specific work. Doing both at once will weaken the impact of each.

6. Invest in attitude change beyond a single electoral cycle.

How open a voter is to youth in leadership is the single strongest predictor of whether they will commit to voting for a youth candidate in 2027, stronger than where they live, how educated they are, or what religion they follow. Getting more voters to see young people as capable leaders is the most effective approach to increase youth candidate support. But voters who are least open will not change their views within one campaign season. This takes sustained effort over time.

What Needs to Happen:

- **Civil Society Organisations, INEC:** Run long-term programmes focused specifically on changing how voters think about youth in leadership positions. Give priority to older voters, those with lower levels of education, and communities where religious and traditional leaders shape how people think about politics.
- **Development Partners:** Fund programs to get young candidates onto ballots; party reform, candidate support, and monitoring of how parties select their candidates. At the same time, invest in long-term attitude change work especially in zones where the need is greatest. Plan for both to continue well beyond the 2027 election.
- **Development Partners:** Help get the findings of this report into the hands of political parties, electoral institutions, and civil society organisations so that decisions about where to focus effort and what messages to use are based on what the data actually shows.

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Annex

Table 1.1: Distribution of Respondents Across Demographic Groups (n = 11,196)

	Frequency (n)	Unweighted (%)	Weighted (%)
Gender			
Male	6,704	59.9	52.6
Female	4,492	40.1	47.4
Age Group			
Youth	5,825	52.0	39.7
Middle-Aged	3,715	33.2	35.8
Elderly	1,483	13.2	18.9
Old	173	1.5	5.6
Disability Status			
No	10,516	93.9	92.8
Yes	539	4.8	5.9
Prefer not to say	141	1.3	1.3
Education Level			
No formal	621	5.5	7.9
Primary	713	6.4	7.5
Secondary	3,730	33.3	32.0
Diploma / NCE	3,022	27.0	25.9
Bachelors	2,695	24.1	22.7
Postgraduate	415	3.7	4.0
Religion			
Christianity	5,651	50.5	51.7
Islam	5,258	47.0	45.5
Traditional	185	1.7	1.9
Others	102	0.9	0.9
Location			
Rural	5,800	51.8	51.5
Urban	5,396	48.2	48.5
Geopolitical Zone			
North Central	2,271	20.3	16.6
North East	1,820	16.3	13.5
North West	2,443	21.8	23.9
South East	1,321	11.8	11.8
South South	1,563	14.0	17.1
South West	1,778	15.9	17.1

Table 2.1: Average Share of Selected Voting Criteria by Category and Demographic Group

Average percentage of each voter's selections falling into each voting-criteria category | Weighted estimates

Category	N	Candidate-Centred(%)	Identity-Based(%)	Social Influence(%)
All Respondents	11,196	66.2	16.9	16.9
Gender				
Male	6,704	65.7	17.6	16.7
Female	4,492	66.9	16.1	17.0
Age Group				
Youth	5,825	65.1	16.9	18.0
Middle-Aged	3,715	66.8	17.1	16.1
Elderly	1,483	67.3	16.5	16.2
Old	173	67.2	17.1	15.7
Education Level				
No formal	621	58.6	21.8	19.7
Primary	713	59.6	22.1	18.3
Secondary	3,730	64.8	18.0	17.3
Diploma / NCE	3,022	67.0	16.1	16.8
Bachelors	2,695	71.4	13.7	14.9
Postgraduate	415	71.1	12.4	16.5
Religion				
Christianity	5,651	70.8	14.5	14.7
Islam	5,258	61.3	19.5	19.1
Traditional	185	60.3	18.3	21.4
Others	102	67.1	17.3	15.5
Location				
Rural	5,800	66.7	16.7	16.6
Urban	5,396	65.8	17.1	17.1
Geopolitical Zone				
North West	2,271	60.3	20.9	18.8
North East	1,820	62.9	18.6	18.6
South South	2,443	68.2	16.5	15.4
North Central	1,321	69.0	14.7	16.3
South West	1,563	69.3	14.3	16.4
South East	1,778	71.0	14.4	14.6

Candidate-Centred criteria: track record, integrity & honesty, qualification, policy & manifesto, personally relevant issues.

Identity-Based criteria: ethnic/regional background, religious affiliation, party affiliation, gender, age.

Social Influence criteria: endorsement, family recommendations.

Electability is classified as Strategic and excluded from the calculation.

Table 3.1. Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Past Voting for a Youth Candidate

Outcome: Voted for a youth candidate (Yes = 1) | Weighted estimates

Predictor	Odds Ratio	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI	p-value
Gender (ref: Female)				
Male	1.12	0.97	1.30	0.1222
Age group (ref: Youth)				
Middle-Aged	1.58	1.37	1.83	0.0000*
Elderly	1.58	1.27	1.99	0.0001*
Old	1.71	1.01	2.90	0.0442*
Education Level (ref: No Formal)				
Primary	1.45	0.99	2.11	0.0546
Secondary	1.20	0.88	1.64	0.2459
Diploma/NCE	1.88	1.37	2.57	0.0001*
Bachelors	2.31	1.65	3.25	0.0000*
Postgraduate	1.47	0.92	2.34	0.1061
Religion (ref: Islam)				
Christianity	1.09	0.90	1.32	0.3996
Others	1.32	0.65	2.68	0.4418
Traditional	1.72	1.04	2.85	0.0354*
Location (ref: Rural)				
Urban	0.75	0.65	0.86	0.0000*
Geopolitical Zone (ref: South East)				
South West	1.61	1.18	2.21	0.0030*
North East	1.64	1.19	2.26	0.0027*
South South	2.32	1.69	3.19	0.0000*
North Central	2.43	1.76	3.36	0.0000*
North West	3.77	2.69	5.28	0.0000*
Information Sources				
Traditional Media	2.10	1.79	2.46	0.0000*
Digital & Social Media	1.12	0.94	1.33	0.1972
Party Channels	1.07	0.91	1.26	0.4059
Community & Religious Leaders	1.02	0.85	1.23	0.8152
Social Networks	0.94	0.80	1.09	0.3984
Top Influence Sources				
Party Leaders	1.19	0.97	1.46	0.0982
Media	1.09	0.87	1.36	0.4576
Religious Leaders	1.09	0.88	1.35	0.4431
Family	0.81	0.64	1.01	0.0663
Voting Criteria Type				
Candidate-Centred Criteria Share	1.80	1.19	2.74	0.0054*
Identity-Based Criteria Share	3.22	2.05	5.06	0.0000*

Odds ratios > 1 indicate a higher likelihood of having voted for a youth candidate, relative to the reference category.

Candidate-Centred and Identity-Based shares are interpreted relative to Social Influence share.

*Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

Table 4.1. Youth in Leadership Openness Index by Demographic Group

Scale: 1 (most resistant) to 5 (most open) | National mean = 3.52 | Weighted estimates

Category	N	Mean Score	SE	Statistic	p-value
Gender					
Female	4,492	3.53	0.008	t = -1.655	0.0980
Male	6,704	3.52	0.007		
Age Group					
Youth	5,825	3.57	0.007	F = 29.480	0.0000*
Middle-Aged	3,715	3.55	0.009		
Elderly	1,483	3.44	0.014		
Old	173	3.37	0.040		
Education Level					
No formal	621	3.34	0.025	F = 22.541	0.0000*
Primary	713	3.47	0.021		
Secondary	3,730	3.55	0.009		
Diploma / NCE	3,022	3.50	0.011		
Bachelors	2,695	3.59	0.012		
Postgraduate	415	3.55	0.028		
Religion					
Islam	5,258	3.58	0.008	F = 45.688	0.0000*
Christianity	5,651	3.47	0.008		
Others	102	3.43	0.057		
Traditional	185	3.30	0.036		
Location					
Rural	5,800	3.52	0.008	t = 1.186	0.2355
Urban	5,396	3.53	0.008		
Geopolitical Zone					
South East	1,321	3.55	0.017	F = 22.681	0.0000*
North West	2,443	3.58	0.011		
South West	1,778	3.55	0.013		
North Central	2,271	3.52	0.012		
South South	1,563	3.51	0.014		
North East	1,820	3.39	0.016		

Composite score computed from eight items: belief that older people make better leaders; perception that young people lack experience; belief that young people bring fresh ideas and perspectives; perception that young people are not taken seriously; likelihood of supporting issue-focused youth candidates; likelihood of supporting youth candidates with a proven track record; influence of respected leaders' endorsements on voter support; perception that young people lack the maturity for political office.

Negatively worded items were reverse-coded prior to compositing, so that the higher the score, the more open a voter is to youth in leadership.

Standardised Cronbach's α = 0.697. SE: Standard error.

Two-group comparisons use independent samples t-test; multi-group comparisons use one-way ANOVA.

*Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

Table 5.1. Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Future Voting Intention for a Youth Candidate

Outcome: Will definitely vote for a youth candidate in 2027| Weighted estimates

Predictor	Odds Ratio	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI	p-value
Gender (ref: Female)				
Male	1.04	0.89	1.22	0.6284
Age group (ref: Youth)				
Middle-Aged	1.20	1.01	1.41	0.0343*
Elderly	1.06	0.83	1.35	0.6307
Old	1.49	0.84	2.66	0.1760
Education Level (ref: No Formal)				
Primary	1.51	1.02	2.23	0.0402*
Secondary	1.53	1.10	2.11	0.0108*
Diploma/NCE	1.66	1.20	2.31	0.0025*
Bachelors	1.44	1.02	2.04	0.0410*
Postgraduate	1.28	0.80	2.06	0.3062
Religion (ref: Islam)				
Christianity	0.79	0.65	0.97	0.0253*
Others	0.49	0.26	0.90	0.0210*
Traditional	0.81	0.48	1.36	0.4269
Location (ref: Rural)				
Urban	0.73	0.62	0.86	0.0001*
Geopolitical Zone (ref: South East)				
North Central	1.91	1.37	2.65	0.0001*
South West	2.15	1.57	2.93	0.0000*
North East	2.72	1.97	3.77	0.0000*
South South	3.86	2.78	5.36	0.0000*
North West	5.49	3.81	7.91	0.0000*
Information Sources				
Traditional Media	1.55	1.31	1.82	0.0000*
Digital & Social Media	1.16	0.97	1.40	0.1106
Social Networks	1.05	0.88	1.25	0.5891
Community & Religious Leaders	1.03	0.84	1.26	0.7966
Party Channels	0.97	0.81	1.16	0.7259
Influence Sources				
Party Leaders	1.62	1.28	2.05	0.0001*
Family	1.27	1.00	1.63	0.0545
Media	0.95	0.74	1.20	0.6465
Religious Leaders	0.99	0.77	1.28	0.9495
Voting Criteria Type				
Candidate-Centred Criteria Share	2.29	1.47	3.56	0.0002*
Identity-Based Criteria Share	2.42	1.48	3.94	0.0004*
Attitude Toward Women				
Composite Openness Score	6.23	5.21	7.45	0.0000*

Table 5.2. Mean Percentage of Selected Conditions that are Merit-Based, by Demographic Groups

Average share of each respondent's selections that were merit-based, rather than identity-based | National mean = 72.2% | N = 10,375 | Weighted estimates

Category		Mean Merit Share (%)	SE	Statistic	p-value
Gender					
Female	4,156	73.2	0.58	t = -2.382	0.0172*
Male	6,219	71.4	0.49		
Age Group					
Youth	5,408	72.4	0.47	F = 0.088	0.9666
Middle-Aged	3,449	72.1	0.59		
Elderly	1,358	72.0	0.96		
Old	160	72.7	2.95		
Education Level					
No formal	572	61.3	1.90	F = 22.388	0.0000*
Primary	634	68.1	1.57		
Secondary	3,480	72.0	0.61		
Diploma / NCE	2,814	71.1	0.70		
Bachelors	2,501	77.7	0.71		
Postgraduate	374	78.9	1.73		
Religion					
Islam	4,910	66.4	0.58	F = 81.186	0.0000*
Christianity	5,208	77.8	0.47		
Others	84	63.4	5.34		
Traditional	173	64.4	3.40		
Location					
Rural	5,383	71.7	0.52	t = 1.348	0.1778
Urban	4,992	72.7	0.54		
Geopolitical Zone					
South South	1,491	78.2	0.76	F = 52.569	0.0000*
South East	1,176	78.1	1.22		
North Central	2,142	77.0	0.72		
South West	1,613	74.0	0.93		
North East	1,669	65.8	1.07		
North West	2,284	64.1	0.81		

Merit-based conditions: proven track record, well-known and visible, honest and trustworthy, prior experience, clear policies, relevant education.

Identity-based conditions: preferred party, ethnic group, same religion, endorsed by trusted leaders.

N represents only respondents who selected at least one merit- or identity-based condition ("strong chance of winning" and "Youth in leadership" are excluded from the calculation).

Two-group comparisons use independent samples t-test; multi-group comparisons use one-way ANOVA.

*Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

SE: Standard error.

Frequency Distribution of Respondents by State

State	Frequency (N)
Abia	201
Adamawa	276
Akwa Ibom	216
Anambra	163
Bauchi	317
Bayelsa	148
Benue	218
Borno	193
Cross River	315
Delta	239
Ebonyi	321
Edo	311
Ekiti	317
Enugu	343
FCT Abuja	357
Gombe	340
Imo	293
Jigawa	381
Kaduna	358
Kano	334
Katsina	307
Kebbi	342
Kogi	368
Kwara	339
Lagos	301
Nasarawa	364
Niger	324
Ogun	347
Ondo	202
Osun	301
Oyo	310
Plateau	301
Rivers	334
Sokoto	316
Taraba	200
Yobe	494
Zamfara	405

Distribution of Respondents by State, Senatorial District and LGA

State	Senatorial District	LGA	Frequency (N)
Abia	Abia Central	Ikwoano	50
Abia	Abia Central	Umuahia north	50
Abia	Abia North	Bende	50
Abia	Abia North	Isiukwuato	51
Adamawa	Adamawa Central	Yola north	71
Adamawa	Adamawa Central	Yola south	60
Adamawa	Adamawa Northern	Mayaha	45
Adamawa	Adamawa Northern	Mubi south	14
Adamawa	Adamawa Southern	Ganye	55
Adamawa	Adamawa Southern	Numan	31
Akwa Ibom	Akwa Ibom North West	Ikot Ekpene	59
Akwa Ibom	Akwa Ibom North West	Obot Akara	57
Akwa Ibom	Akwa Ibom South	Okobo	50
Akwa Ibom	Akwa Ibom South	Oron	50
Anambra	Anambra Central	Awka south	14
Anambra	Anambra Central	Njikoka	50
Anambra	Anambra North	Onitsha south	48
Anambra	Anambra North	Oyi	51
Bauchi	Bauchi Central	Darazo	29
Bauchi	Bauchi Central	Misau	60
Bauchi	Bauchi North	Katagum	68
Bauchi	Bauchi North	Shira	53
Bauchi	Bauchi South	Bauchi	51
Bauchi	Bauchi South	Ganjuwa	56
Bayelsa	Bayelsa East	Ogbia	35
Bayelsa	Bayelsa West	Ekeremor	62
Bayelsa	Bayelsa West	Sagbama	51
Benue	Benue North West	Makurdi	57
Benue	Benue North West	Tarka	61
Benue	Benue South	Ogbadibo	50
Benue	Benue South	Otukpo	50
Borno	Borno Central	Konduga	50
Borno	Borno Central	Maiduguri	51
Borno	Borno South	Chibok	42
Borno	Borno South	Gwoza	50
Cross River	Cross River Central	Abi	50
Cross River	Cross River Central	Yakurr	50
Cross River	Cross River North	Ogoja	50
Cross River	Cross River North	Yala	50
Cross River	Cross River South	Bakassi	52
Cross River	Cross River South	Calabar Municipal	63

State	Senatorial District	LGA	Frequency (N)
Delta	Delta Central	Okpe	53
Delta	Delta Central	Uvwie	71
Delta	Delta South	Bomadi	60
Delta	Delta South	Warri south	55
Ebonyi	Ebonyi Central	Ezza north	53
Ebonyi	Ebonyi Central	Ezza south	65
Ebonyi	Ebonyi North	Abakaliki	51
Ebonyi	Ebonyi North	Izzi	53
Ebonyi	Ebonyi South	Ivo	49
Ebonyi	Ebonyi South	Ohaozara	50
Edo	Edo Central	Esan west	50
Edo	Edo Central	Igueben	54
Edo	Edo North	Etsako central	52
Edo	Edo North	Etsako west	55
Edo	Edo South	Ikpoba Okha	50
Edo	Edo South	Oredo	50
Ekiti	Ekiti Central	Ado ekiti	50
Ekiti	Ekiti Central	Irepodun ifelodun	52
Ekiti	Ekiti North	Ido Osi	55
Ekiti	Ekiti North	Oye	47
Ekiti	Ekiti South	Ekiti southwest	55
Ekiti	Ekiti South	Ikere	58
Enugu	Enugu East	Enugu east	64
Enugu	Enugu East	Enugu north	50
Enugu	Enugu North	Edem Ani	50
Enugu	Enugu North	Nsukka	50
Enugu	Enugu West	Ezeagu	59
Enugu	Enugu West	Udi	70
FCT Abuja	FCT AMAC Bwari	Amac	66
FCT Abuja	FCT AMAC Bwari	Bwari	59
FCT Abuja	FCT Abaji Kwali	Abaji	52
FCT Abuja	FCT Abaji Kwali	Kwali	55
FCT Abuja	FCT Gwagwalada Kuje	Gwagwalada	65
FCT Abuja	FCT Gwagwalada Kuje	Kuje	60
Gombe	Gombe Central	Akko	53
Gombe	Gombe Central	Yelmatu Deba	64
Gombe	Gombe North	Dukku	61
Gombe	Gombe North	Gombe	62
Gombe	Gombe South	Kaltungo	50
Gombe	Gombe South	Shongom	50
Imo	Imo East	Ikeduru	59
Imo	Imo East	Owerri municipal	58

State	Senatorial District	LGA	Frequency (N)
Imo	Imo North	Ihite Uboma isinweke	39
Imo	Imo North	Obowo otoko	37
Imo	Imo West	Ohaji egbema	50
Imo	Imo West	Orlu	50
Jigawa	Jigawa North East	Hadejia	59
Jigawa	Jigawa North East	Kafin hausa	75
Jigawa	Jigawa North West	Gagarawa	64
Jigawa	Jigawa North West	Ringim	65
Jigawa	Jigawa South West	Dutse	58
Jigawa	Jigawa South West	Miga	60
Kaduna	Kaduna Central	Kubau	57
Kaduna	Kaduna Central	Lere	72
Kaduna	Kaduna North	Kudan	69
Kaduna	Kaduna North	Zaria	60
Kaduna	Kaduna South	Jaba	50
Kaduna	Kaduna South	Kachia	50
Kano	Kano Central	Fagge	57
Kano	Kano Central	Kumbotso	57
Kano	Kano North	Tofa	61
Kano	Kano North	Tsanyawa	60
Kano	Kano South	Bebeji	50
Kano	Kano South	Wudil	49
Katsina	Katsina Central	Dustin-ma	51
Katsina	Katsina Central	Rimi	71
Katsina	Katsina North	Kankia	49
Katsina	Katsina North	Kusada	50
Katsina	Katsina South	Danja	51
Katsina	Katsina South	Funtua	35
Kebbi	Kebbi Central	Birnin kebbi	50
Kebbi	Kebbi Central	Kalgo	50
Kebbi	Kebbi North	Argungu	71
Kebbi	Kebbi North	Augie	70
Kebbi	Kebbi South	Danko wasagu	50
Kebbi	Kebbi South	Sakaba	51
Kogi	Kogi Central	Okehi	62
Kogi	Kogi Central	Okene	70
Kogi	Kogi East	Ankpa	68
Kogi	Kogi East	Dekina	54
Kogi	Kogi West	Kabba	61
Kogi	Kogi West	Lokoja	53
Kwara	Kwara Central	Asa	55
Kwara	Kwara Central	Ilorin west	62

State	Senatorial District	LGA	Frequency (N)
Kwara	Kwara North	Edu	53
Kwara	Kwara North	Patigi	51
Kwara	Kwara South	Irepodun	65
Kwara	Kwara South	Offa	53
Lagos	Lagos Central	Apapa	51
Lagos	Lagos Central	Surulere	51
Lagos	Lagos East	Epe	49
Lagos	Lagos East	Shomolu	50
Lagos	Lagos West	Badagry	51
Lagos	Lagos West	Ojo	49
Nasarawa	Nasarawa North	Akwanga	59
Nasarawa	Nasarawa North	Nasarawa eggon	57
Nasarawa	Nasarawa South	Keana	74
Nasarawa	Nasarawa South	Obi	67
Nasarawa	Nasarawa West	Karu	58
Nasarawa	Nasarawa West	Nasarawa	49
Niger	Niger East	Suleja	59
Niger	Niger East	Tafa	54
Niger	Niger North	Kontagora	61
Niger	Niger North	Rijau	50
Niger	Niger South	Bida	50
Niger	Niger South	Edati	50
Ogun	Ogun Central	Abeokuta south	48
Ogun	Ogun Central	Ifo	51
Ogun	Ogun East	Ijebu north	65
Ogun	Ogun East	Sagamu	63
Ogun	Ogun West	Ad Odo Ota	70
Ogun	Ogun West	Yewa South	50
Ondo	Ondo Central	Akure south	50
Ondo	Ondo Central	Ifedore	50
Ondo	Ondo North	Akungba	51
Ondo	Ondo North	Ikare	51
Osun	Osun Central	Odo otin	50
Osun	Osun Central	Osogbo	50
Osun	Osun East	Ife central	52
Osun	Osun East	Ife north	50
Osun	Osun West	Ede north	49
Osun	Osun West	Irewole	50
Oyo	Oyo Central	Egbeda	53
Oyo	Oyo Central	Ona Ara	58
Oyo	Oyo North	Iseyin	43
Oyo	Oyo North	Ogbomosho north	56

State	Senatorial District	LGA	Frequency (N)
Oyo	Oyo South	Ibadan North	50
Oyo	Oyo South	Ido	50
Plateau	Plateau Central	Mangu	50
Plateau	Plateau Central	Pankshin	50
Plateau	Plateau North	Bassa	49
Plateau	Plateau North	Jos north	50
Plateau	Plateau South	Mikang	55
Plateau	Plateau South	Shendam	47
Rivers	Rivers East	Etche	54
Rivers	Rivers East	Okrika	65
Rivers	Rivers South East	Ikwerre	60
Rivers	Rivers South East	Obio Akpor	55
Rivers	Rivers West	Ahoada east	50
Rivers	Rivers West	Degema	50
Sokoto	Sokoto East	Rabah	52
Sokoto	Sokoto East	Wurno	42
Sokoto	Sokoto North	Sokoto south	49
Sokoto	Sokoto North	Wamakko	53
Sokoto	Sokoto South	Dange Shuni	63
Sokoto	Sokoto South	Yabo	57
Taraba	Taraba Central	Bali	50
Taraba	Taraba Central	Sardauna	50
Taraba	Taraba South	Takum	51
Taraba	Taraba South	Ussa	49
Yobe	Yobe East	Gashuwa	85
Yobe	Yobe East	Machina	148
Yobe	Yobe North	Bade	48
Yobe	Yobe North	Nguru	76
Yobe	Yobe South	Fune	73
Yobe	Yobe South	Potiskum	64
Zamfara	Zamfara Central	Bungudu	57
Zamfara	Zamfara Central	Gusau	51
Zamfara	Zamfara North	Kaura namoda	69
Zamfara	Zamfara North	Shinkafi	91
Zamfara	Zamfara West	Bukkuyum	63
Zamfara	Zamfara West	Gummi	74

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